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Max Weber and the Complexity of  
Parliamentary Democracy: Applying Formal and  
Substantive Rationality to the English and Welsh  
Education Policy-making Process 
Richard Race∗ 
Abstract: This article illustrates the importance of Max 
Weber’s attitude to both bureaucratic and political func-
tions. Formal and substantive rational concepts are applied 
to distinguish the actions of education civil servants and 
politicians in relation to education policy-making. Evidence 
is taken from English and Welsh Educational and Public 
Administration Parliamentary Select Committees of the 
1970s and the present day. We gain from Weber’s ideas a 
relevant framework to critique the relationship and signifi-
cantly the historical and contemporary roles of education 
civil servants and politicians. The article demonstrates that a 
change has occurred with more substantive inputs visible 
within both the education relationship and general policy-
making processes. The article further argues that Parliamen-
tary Select Committees are crucial in questioning both for-
mal and substantive influences within parliamentary democ-
racy. 
“We are concerned … Mr Normington, that sometimes we 
think you, as a Department, take us a bit for granted; and 
one of the ambitions for us, as a Select Committee, was to 
get your radar, we actually wanted you to be conscious, 
when you talked to the Secretary of State, when you made 
decisions, or made mistakes, or whichever, that there is a 
Select Committee, that wants to have, yes, a healthy rela-
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Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, U.K.; E-mail: spa39@keele.ac.uk 
  The majority of the research from this article originates from a PhD thesis, Race (2001) 
‘Bureaucratic rationality, flux or neutrality? Analysing the relationship between civil ser-
vants and politicians affecting education policy, 1970-74’ (ESRC Studentship Number 
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tionship with you … we want you to be aware that we exist 
… you see us as a kind of peripheral irritant, rather than 
anything meaningful in your life.” [Chairman of the Educa-
tion Select Committee. Mr. Barry Sheerman, MP talking to 
David Normington, Permanent Secretary of State for Edu-
cation, HoC, 2002d:87]. 
Weber and the rationalization of modern bureaucracy 
Weber’s ideas concerning bureaucracy highlight the danger of an expanding 
modern state and the power civil servants exercise through rational administra-
tion. This was summed up by Weber’s concept of the “rationalization of the 
world”, whose success would be attributed to bureaucracy as the primary 
mechanism of its achievement. ‘Rationalization of the world’ leads to effi-
ciency, influence and control of the social environment. When creating his 
theories of bureaucracy, Weber was interested in the design and function of 
modern administration. His inspiration derived from his family background and 
the economic position and development of the modern German state. As Col-
lins (1986) suggests, the fact that Weber’s father was a politician in the German 
Reichstag exposed the young Weber to his father’s colleagues and political 
environment. Industrialism throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies in Germany was shaping a new German economy and the growth of 
capitalism threatened a change in the nature of the German State. A new indus-
trial middle class was challenging the economic hegemony of the rural, Prus-
sian landlord. Classical liberal values were being challenged by greater state 
intervention to cope with industrial, urban expansion (Mommsen, 1977; Scaff, 
1984). Weber was highlighting the movement from traditional to modern forms 
of bureaucratic authority within German society.  
Within his historical and sociological analysis of bureaucracy, Weber was 
interested in the processes of formal rationality within the modern state. What 
this meant was that processes of rationality were increasing during the modern 
period and the state was having more influence in society through bureaucratic 
means. Weber argued senior bureaucrats have loyalties to their departments 
and administering policies, as well as to their political counterparts in the cen-
tral state, although the impersonal, impartial nature of the relationship had 
caused problems within the German State.1 Strict objectivity can be witnessed 
                                                          
1  For British perspectives on questioning the role of the Whitehall bureaucratic see: Barberis, 
P. (Ed.)  (1996) The Whitehall Reader. The UK’s administrative machine in action, Buck-
ingham, Open University Press; Chapman, R. A. (1984) Leadership in the British Civil Ser-
vice, London, Croom Helm; Dowding, K. (1995) The Civil Service, London, Routledge; 
Fry, G.K. (1985) The Changing Civil Service, London, George Allen & Unwin; Headey, B. 
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within modern bureaucratic management that influences how written docu-
ments are controlled or ‘filed’. This raises the issue of control of documenta-
tion and what information bureaus give.  
Although Weber (1968, 1992) did not define the term bureaucracy, it is sig-
nificant that he focuses on the basic features common to large-scale administra-
tion. But within this context, Weber (1968:979) acknowledges that, ‘... within 
bureaucracy i.e. all state activities that fall outside the field of law creation and 
court procedure, one has been accustomed to claims for the freedom and the 
paramountcy of individual circumstances.’ Weber here points toward inde-
pendent economic and political interests that can function outside state influ-
ence and intervention. He (ibid.) argues that bureaucracy has its own power to 
consider within the state and suggests, ‘... it is always these interests which tip 
the balance.’ Weber (1968, 1992) himself was forthright with his praise for the 
German civil service and the power position they held, but was aware within 
his writings of the danger of, ‘… a closed status group of officials’ and ‘[the] 
minimization of the authority of officialdom.’ This was highlighted in his 
metaphor of the ‘iron cage of bureaucracy.’ The dangers for Weber were a 
closed status group of state bureaucrats and the maximization of bureaucratic 
authority. Weber2 wanted German politicians to create and influence policy 
within the state, not civil servants within the German bureaucratic machine. He 
was concerned with the increasing ability of bureaucracy to accumulate power 
and authority within the formal rational framework of hierarchy, continuity, 
impersonality and expertise. The nature of the state, for Weber, should involve 
limited state interference concerning the individual. However, Weber wanted 
greater political involvement within the policy-making process. He believed 
rational bureaucrats had too great an influence on policy-making.  
                                                                                                                          
(1974) British Cabinet Ministers. The Roles of Politicians in Executive Office, London, 
George Allen & Unwin; Hennessy, P. (1989) Whitehall, New York, The Free Press; 
Hennessy, P. (1996) Muddling Through. Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in 
Postwar Britain, London, Victor Gollancz; Stanworth, P. Giddens, A (Eds.) (1974) Elites 
and Power in British Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Theakston, K. 
(1996) ‘The Heath Government, Whitehall and the Civil Service’ in Ball, S., Seldon, A. 
(Eds.) The Heath Government: a reappraisal, London, Longman, pp 75-106; Young, H. 
(1993) One of Us, London, Pan Books. For international insights into the role and function 
of the civil servant see: Begley, P. T., Leonard, P. E. (Eds.) The Values of Educational Ad-
ministration, London, The Falmer Press; Derlien H-U. (1999) ‘On the Selective Interpreta-
tion of Max Weber’s Concept of Bureaucracy in Organization Theory and Administrative 
Science’ in Ahonen, P., Palonen, K. (Eds.) Dis-Embalming Max Weber, Jyvaskyla, Univer-
sity of Jyvaskyla; Evers, C. Chapman, J. (Eds.) (1995) Educational Administration. An Aus-
tralian Perspective, St. Leonards, Allen and Unwin; Granastein, J. L. (1998) The Ottawa 
Men. The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 
2  Weber (1968:1381) states with regard to Parliament in a Reconstructed Germany, ‘This 
political treatise is a revision and enlargement of articles published in the Franfurter Zei-
tung during the summer of 1917.’ 
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Formal and Substantive Rationality 
Weber (1968) distinguishes between formal rationality which highlights the 
means of achieving efficiency and substantive rationality which considers ends 
themselves that are functionally rational but lead to substantially irrational 
ends. Formal rationality imposes order on the world through a system of meas-
urement and calculable ability. Substantive rationality relies on values and 
subjective action. Clegg (1994) and Wallerstein (2000) highlight the impor-
tance of substantive rationality and underline Weber’s argument that political 
actions cannot be measured in terms of formal calculation. Permanent civil 
servants have advantages over their elected parliamentary counterparts. As 
Weber (1968:225) argues, ‘Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally 
domination through knowledge ... bureaucratic organisations, or the holders of 
power who make use of them, have the tendency to increase their power still 
further by the knowledge growing out of the experience of service.’  
Weber’s theories and writings acknowledge that bureaucracy through its 
modern functions, its accumulated knowledge and expertise over time, must 
have some influence over the policy-making process within the central state. 
According to Weber’s position, bureaucracy is a form of organisation superior 
to all others and further bureaucratization and rationalization is an escapable 
fact. With regard to the central state relationship, something had to be done to 
counter this influence. Weber suggests that substantive rationality should be 
employed to counter formal rationality within the central state. Bureaucratic 
functions, in the 1970s and today, are still being carried out by education bu-
reaucrats in Whitehall. If bureaucratic functions are influencing policy-making 
procedure, then Weber’s writings I would suggest allow a critique of the role 
and influence of bureaucrats within the central state during both education 
administrations at the Department of Education and Science (DES) and De-
partment of Education and Skills (DfES) respectively.  
Weber (1968, 1992) was interested in how politicians could keep their indi-
vidual freedoms from greater bureaucratic control. He argues that both the 
elected politician and the permanent bureaucrat should exercise responsibility 
and power within the central state. However, individual freedom should allow 
politicians to carry out their role as policy-makers without bureaucratic inter-
vention. Weber’s ideas were thus a combination of German Liberalism and 
Nationalism that feared an increase in bureaucratic rationalisation which would 
hinder the self-responsible nature of the individual (Mommsen, 1965, 1974, 
1977). Weber wanted more political involvement in the policy-making process. 
He used Bismarck as an example of political leadership although this in itself 
had caused problems for the German State3. Giddens (1972) highlights the 
                                                          
3  For more on the influence of Bismarck on political leadership see: Diggins, J. P. (1996) 
Max Weber. Politics and the Spirit of Tragedy, New York, Basic Books; Eliaeson, S. 
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problem of political development, or this source of tension between democracy 
and bureaucracy, as the ‘legacy’ of Bismarck, who had left a strong bureauc-
racy with no means of allowing independent political leadership to flourish. 
Bismarck left what Mommsen (1984:164) describes as ‘conservative creature 
bureaucrats’ in the state. The processes within modernity and industrialism had 
changed the nature of the central state. Weber feared the iron cage of bureauc-
racy would obliterate individualism and political freedom. The iron cage was a 
condition of modernity (Weber, 1992; Clegg, 1990) and underlines Weber’s 
pessimistic vision of increased rationality. Weber argues that civil servants 
question political policies and ideas that might not be in the interest of state 
departments. However, this as far as civil servant influence in the policy-
making process should go. Duty, for the bureaucrat, stands above personal 
preference. An issue for Weber therefore concerned what parliament and politi-
cians could accomplish to counter bureaucratic knowledge, rational authority 
and civil service influence within the central state relationship. For Weber, 
(1968:1408-1411) parliament had to control the selection of administrative 
heads, as well as becoming accountable through committees and most signifi-
cantly, controlling the administration along the guidelines accepted by Parlia-
ment. Weber wanted people with political instincts to come forward with the 
motive of political power who would be capable of being politically responsi-
ble. He argued that Parliament was hardly the right environment to attract the 
individuals who could form and shape policy-making within the political sys-
tem. The material rewards for capable and ambitious individuals lay outside 
Parliament. However for those who wanted political power, the task within 
Parliament was clear. Politicians had to become the countervailing force 
against bureaucratic domination within the German State. In relation to politics 
and substantive rationality, the British Parliamentary Committee, for Weber 
(1968:1419-1421) was an example of a possible breeding ground for future 
capable politicians: ‘The continuos supervision which would be introduced by 
the seemingly unspectacular right of parliamentary inquiry is the basic precon-
dition for all further reforms aiming at an increase of parliament’s share in 
government.’ Weber (ibid.) continues, ‘Only such co-operation between civil 
servants and politicians can guarantee the continuos supervision of the admini-
stration and with it the political education of leaders and led.’ The question that 
Held et al (1984:37) raise is surely one that Weber considered: ‘How can bu-
reaucratic power be checked?’ We can see from Weber’s (1968, 1992) work 
that substantive rationality, expressed within a strong Parliament was required 
to check bureaucratic rational legal authority and formal influence. 
                                                                                                                          
(1998) ‘Max Weber and Plebiscitary Democracy’ in Schroeder, R. (Ed.) Max Weber, De-
mocracy and Modernization, London, Macmillan, pp. 47-60; Krasnodebski, Z. (1998) 
‘Back to Mittleuropa’? Weber, Germany, and Contemporary Central Europe’ in Schroeder, 
R. (Ed.) Max Weber, Democracy and Modernization, London, Macmillan, pp. 129-144. 
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Bureaucratic and political understandings of education 
policy-making, 1970-1974 
Civil servants William Pile4
 
(1974, 1979) and Toby Weaver5 (1973, 1979) have 
provided personal insights into the function of the DES within the policy-
making process. Margaret Thatcher6 (1968, 1995) has also offered her opinions 
on her interaction, as a politician, with her civil servants at the DES. Pile (HoC, 
1976:11), in his evidence to the Parliamentary Expenditure Committee Report, 
maintained that education policy is about, ‘... objectives, priorities and deci-
sions ... which are settled by ministers and not by civil servants ... many of 
these objectives and priorities are settled politically, for example, in manifes-
tos, before an administration comes into office ... the job of civil servants is to 
serve the government and ministers of the day.‘ In other words, Pile believed 
that education bureaucrats serve politicians and that civil servants administer 
rather than influence or determine in any way education policy. Pile (1979:4) 
further stated that ‘... the DES shapes the environment which shapes policies, 
procedures and personalities of the DES. The words control and direction con-
vey an impression of omnipotence which has never corresponded with reality.’ 
Pile’s understanding of the role of civil servants and the definition of policy-
making differs from Weaver’s; so did his understanding of the role of the DES 
in policy-making and implementation. This is evidenced by the terminology 
Weaver (1979: 7-9) used: ‘Control is concerned with the conferment and exer-
cise of powers (what may be done) as with the imposition and fulfillment of 
duties (what must be done) … Every control embodies a policy; every policy 
exemplifies a control.‘ For him, control was the element that best represented 
the function of the DES. The level of control education bureaucrats had in the 
DES with regard to policy-making was important. Policy, for Weaver 
(1979:43) established '... the content of educational control. It defines or de-
scribes guidelines for the pursuit of the course of action desired.' On the con-
trary, policy for Pile shaped rather than controlled the educational environment.  
Thatcher also maintained that she had a list of policies in June 1970 when 
she arrived at the DES.7 Then, she had been ‘welcomed’ by outgoing perma-
                                                          
4  William Pile was Permanent Secretary of State for Education at the DES, 1970-1976. 
5  Toby Weaver was Deputy Secretary of State for Education at the DES, 1962-1973. 
6  Margaret Thatcher was Secretary of State for Education at the DES, 1970-1974. 
7  With the Conservative Party’s General Election victory in 1970, Prime Minister, Edward 
Heath preserved Margaret Thatcher’s portfolio, as she went from Shadow to Secretary of 
State for Education. The Conservative Party Archive, situated at the Bodleian Library, Ox-
ford University, provides a resource into how Conservative education policy was discussed, 
made and ultimately published in the 1970 party manifesto. An education advisory commit-
tee on policy (ACP (68) 52) was chaired by William van Straubenzee, who later become 
Joint Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Education at the DES, 1970-1972. Steering 
Committees (third draft, SC/68/11, fourth draft, SC/7012) followed the advisory committee. 
Within the advisory committee, importance is placed on the secondary sector of education, 
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nent secretary, Sir Herbert Andrew and incoming Permanent Secretary, Wil-
liam Pile. As she (1995:165) herself has stated: ‘It was all too easy to slip once 
more into the warm water of civil service respect for ‘the minister’.’ Yet, 
Young and Sloman (1986) demonstrated that from the start there was an abra-
sive but lively relationship between Pile and Thatcher in 1970. Pile (in Young 
and Sloman, 1986:23) reflected on it: ‘Within the first ten minutes of her arri-
val she uncovered two things to us; one is, I think what I would call an innate 
wariness of the civil service, quite possibly even a distrust and secondly a page 
from an exercise book with eighteen things she wanted done that day ... she 
though the civil service would oppose.’ It is interesting to note both Pile’s 
opinion of Thatcher’s ‘innate wariness’ of the civil service as well as the belief 
of the Secretary of State that bureaucrats ‘would oppose political policies’. 
With regard to Circular 10/708, Thatcher (1995:168) voiced her opinion that 
political interests could clash with bureaucratic values: ‘My civil servants made 
no secret of the fact that they considered that a Circular should contain a good 
deal of material setting out the department’s views on its preferred shape for 
secondary education in the country as a whole. This might take for ever, and in 
any event I did not see things that way.’ The ‘departments views’ actually 
clashed with Thatcher’s political views regarding the content of the Circular 
and her insistence that the policy document tried to preserve as many grammar 
and direct-aided schools as possible in 1970.  
Pile agreed that ultimately, ministers decided on policies that are introduced. 
However, if as Weaver had suggested, the DES is essentially a policy-making 
body, can politicians be effective and create education policy? Weaver gave the 
impression that the influence of the education bureaucrat far outweighed the 
administrative role of the civil servant. If this is the case, how far should the 
policy functions of the DES be allowed to influence education policy-making? 
Arguably, the answers to both questions are positive. This is highlighted in 
previous education policy documentation e.g. Circulars 10/65 and 10/66 con-
cerning secondary reorganization policies that requested that all local education 
                                                                                                                          
preserving direct and grant aided school status (ACP: recommendation 15, paragraph 41) 
and a call for postgraduate student grants to be replaced by loans, (ACP: recommendation 
39, paragraph 86) a measure introduced almost thirty years after the discussions of the advi-
sory committee. These examples highlight both the immediate and incremental nature of 
different substantive education policy recommendations. 
8  Circular 10/70 asked local education authorities to ‘reconsider’ or ‘modify’ existing secon-
dary school comprehensive reorganisation schemes. It involved no consultation with local 
education authorities, teacher unions and limited discussion with DES civil servants. Its 
nature and speed of introduction is unique. It took only eight days to introduce, in compari-
son with over a year for the introduction of Circular 10/65. See: Gordon, P., Aldrich, R., 
Dean, D. (1991) Education and Policy in England in the Twentieth Century, London, The 
Woburn Press; Kogan, M. (1978) The Politics of Educational Change, Manchester, Man-
chester University Press; Lawrence, I. (1992) Power and Politics at the Department of 
Education and Science, London, Cassell; Ribbins, P., Sherratt, B. (1997) Radical Educa-
tional Policies and Conservative Secretaries of State, London, Cassell. 
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authorities (LEAs) submitted proposals to the DES for comprehensive reor-
ganisation.9 Pile (1979:36) explained: ‘... it is an officials’ business to advise 
their ministers on policy.’ As Weaver (1979:58) elaborated: ‘Ministers ulti-
mately make policy while officials apply policy. In exercising his prerogative 
of determining policy he is performing a political function. The Secretary of 
State is concerned with conflicts of interest, public relations, calculation of 
risks, distribution of power and judgements of value.’ It is clearly the ministers’ 
responsibility to make the important policy decisions, but it is also clear that 
civil servants have varying degrees of influence on the education policy-
making process, especially if the minister is incapable of being responsible due 
to inexperience or mis-understanding of the policy-making process.  
Although Weaver admitted that policies are adopted through political chan-
nels, he also mentioned the economic restrictions involved in education ad-
ministration. The power of the purse can be seen within the external factors 
affecting policy-making, for example, the economic situation in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s and the freezing of educational expenditure in 1968 
(DES,1969). Ultimately, Weaver (1973:3) argued the education system was 
heavily conditioned by central political and bureaucratic experience and ex-
plained the historical process of education policy from his own career: ‘... as a 
civil servant I have learnt that, by what I can see now as a historical process, 
each in turn of the many Ministers I have served has done much to create the 
circumstances ... in which successors’ have been forced to act.’ Ministers thus 
face a policy legacy from the previous political administration, but more sig-
nificantly they also face a departmental policy which is grounded in special-
ised, technical, bureaucratic knowledge and expertise (Kellner and Crowther-
Hunt, 1981). The civil servant can therefore have differing degrees of influence 
on education policy. As this section has highlighted, different degrees of influ-
ence depend on the permanent status of the civil servant and the knowledge 
gained over time compared to the elected and more inexperienced politician.  
                                                          
9  For an insight into the literature on comprehensive reorganisation, see: Benn, C., Chitty, C. 
(1997) Thirty Years On. Is Comprehensive Education Alive and Well or Struggling to Sur-
vive? London, Penguin; Edwards, T., Whitty, G., Power, S. (1999) ‘Moving Back from 
Comprehensive Education? in Demaine, J. (Ed.) Education Policy and Contemporary Poli-
tics, London, Macmillan, pp. 30-43; Kogan, M. (1971) The Politics of Education, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin; Lowe, R. (1997) Schooling and Social Change, 1964-1990, 
London, Routledge; McCulloch, G. (2002) ‘Secondary Education’ in Aldrich, R. (Ed.) A 
Century of Education, London, RoutledgeFalmer, pp. 31-53; Simon, B. (1991) Education 
and the Social Order. British Education since 1944, London, Lawrence and Wishart. 
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Contemporary examples of the interaction between civil 
servants and politicians10 
There is little question that the general, as well as the education relationship 
between civil servants and politicians is markedly different now compared to 
what it was thirty years ago. As David Normington (HoC, 2002d:6) informs the 
Education Select Committee, the lines separating Ministers and bureaucrats 
have blurred, due to more substantive inputs into the education policy-making 
process from politicians and policy advisers. Normington (ibid.) justifies this 
increase of input through consultation with Education Minister, Estelle Morris, 
in relation to the implementation of policy. Issues are discussed and the Perma-
nent Secretary of State will ‘go away and try and put it right’. This confession 
is relevant, as the thoughts of William Pile or Toby Weaver (HoC, 1976) com-
ing out with a comment similar to Normington seems to be slim. The issue of 
political advisers is not new, in fact Ted Heath’s government witnessed a sharp 
rise in the number of political appointees11, but the recent substantial increase 
in numbers did have substantive consequences for parliamentary democracy. 
Technically, political advisers appointed by Ministers to work on policy crea-
tion today have to abide by civil servant rules within Ministries. They have the 
unofficial role of temporary civil servants. Andrew Turnbull (HoC, 2002f:27) 
argues that these appointees either ‘sink or swim’ but interestingly, ‘very little 
effort is made to train them, look at their performance [and] to get them to 
understand what their responsibilities are’. The most topical example of a clash 
                                                          
10  Within the Department for Education and Skills: (DfES) Estelle Morris is Secretary of State 
for Education and Skills; Stephen Twigg is Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Young People; David Milliband is Minister of State for School Standards; and, David 
Normington is Permanent Secretary of State for Education. Within the Cabinet Office, An-
drew Turnbull replaced Richard Wilson as Permanent Secretary of State for the Civil Ser-
vice in September 2002. David Puttnam was the first Chairperson of the General Teaching 
Council and resigned from his post in June 2002. Estelle Morris resigned as Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills in October 2002 and was replaced by Charles Clarke. 
11  Within the DES, the Department Planning Organisation (DPO) was created in 1971, along-
side the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) and the Central Policy Review Staff 
(CPRS). The CPRS was essentially a substantive ‘think tank’, the equivalent of a contem-
porary Quango and was designed to influence policy-making within the DPO. However, the 
DPO came up with recommendations which were published in the 1972 Education White 
Paper, Education: A framework for Expansion (DES, 1972). The White Paper took 18 
months to create and covered 3/4s of education expenditure. If you compare the creation 
time with Circular 10/70, understanding is increased in relation to the nature and role of 
politicians and civil servants in policy-making. Historically, politicians had more substan-
tive influence on smaller policy documents (Circular 10/70) while civil servants had more 
input (through PESC) in larger policy documentation (Education: A Framework for Expan-
sion). See: Ball, S[teven] J. (1990) Politics and Policy Making in Education. Explorations 
in Policy Sociology. London, Routledge; Theakston, K. (1996) ‘The Heath Government, 
Whitehall and the Civil Service’ in Ball, S[tuart], Seldon, A. (Eds. ) The Heath Govern-
ment, 1970-1974, A Reappraisal, London, Longman. 
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between civil servant and political adviser was that of Martin Sixsmith and Jo 
Moore over the ‘burying of bad news’ on September 11th, 2001, which eventu-
ally led to both Sixsmith and Moore resigning their positions, as well as the 
Minister for Transport, Stephen Byers. Perhaps a more overt example of the 
importance and role of the political adviser is raised by Richard Wilson 
(2002a:359) who states in the Public Administration Select Committee that ‘… 
half of the special advisers employed in the Cabinet Office are in press work.’ 
Wilson’s comment suggests the role of news management is continuing to 
change the face of parliamentary democracy. The nature of the state today 
involves greater press manipulation, as well as bureaucratic clashes with politi-
cal advisers which highlights more substantive inputs into both politics and 
government. 
The Chairman of the Education Select Committee, Barry Sheerman, MP, 
raises the issue of civil servant (or lack of) involvement in the creation of Gen-
eral Teaching Council (GTC)12. Both Education Ministers and Permanent Sec-
retary of State are asked to respond to civil servant inaction concerning the  
implementation of legislation. David Milliband and Stephen Twigg are cross-
examined over this event. Twigg (2002g:729) calls his civil servants ‘dedicated 
and enthusiastic … people’ and capable of producing quality management. 
However, the Select Committee are concerned about this episode as they had 
listened to the first President of the GTC, Lord David Puttnam, (HoC, 2002b) 
who was scathing in his criticism of the civil service for their indifference to 
the GTC’s creation. Significantly both Miliband and Twigg’s predecessors in 
the Department for Education and Skills were ‘re-shuffled’ just after Puttnam 
left his position.13 Healy and Timms are not in a position to respond to Putt-
nam’s arguments because they are no longer within the DfES. It is the continu-
ing case that the major importance of the Select Committee is to raise these 
issues in front of both politicians and civil servants. Normington (HoC, 
2002d:111-114) defends the DfES under cross-examination, although he ad-
mits to ‘a mistake in the drafting of the legislation’ but no mistake ‘through 
lack of [civil servant] commitment. Consequently, the GTC has not had the 
best of beginnings and is still building its reputation within education and 
amongst teachers who are legally required to join the organisation. This it 
                                                          
12  The General Teaching Council (GTC) is an independent professional body for the teaching 
profession in England. It came into being in 2000 and has two functions: i. Advise govern-
ment on education policy; ii. Reflect the professional views of teachers and maintain high 
professional standards that already exist. The GTC has a 64-member council, 44 of whom 
are practising teachers. However, the Minister of State for Education appoints some mem-
bers which highlights its substantive nature. See Race (2002) ‘Teacher Professionalism or 
De-Professionalization? The consequences of school based management on domestic and 
international contexts.’ British Education Research Association Journal, Vol 28, 3, pp. 459-
464.  
13  Miliband and Twigg’s predecessors were: John Healey MP, Public Under Secretary of State 
for Adult Skills; and, Steven Timms MP, Minister of State for School Standards. 
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seems, from the evidence, is an example of continued rational legal authority 
within the central state. 
One of the advantages of the Select Committee is that it provides politicians 
with a check and balance system in relation to their civil servants. Normington 
(HoC, 2002d:66) is reminded that civil servants names and telephone numbers 
have been removed from the DfES annual report. In agreeing to include these 
point of contact details for the general public, Normington (HoC, 2002d:67) 
replies that ‘nobody reads the Departmental Report’. In response, Select Com-
mittee member, Mr. John Baron MP, says. ‘We do.’ This comment highlights a 
Weberian interpretation of what the DfES select committee entails. It is a par-
liamentary substantive check on the role and influence of central civil servant 
implementation of education policy. Andrew Turnbull (HoC, 2002f:99) has to 
deflect criticism from the Public Administration Select Committee concerning 
bureaucrats falling out with one another over turf wars relating to Departmental  
policies. Turnbull’s job as he sees it is to prevent disagreements amongst bu-
reaucrats. This is becoming increasingly difficult, as Turnbull’s predecessor, 
Richard Wilson (HoC, 2002a:366) argues, ‘… the Civil Service is engaged or 
probably engaged on the most radical programme of reform of any civil service 
in the western world’. This concerns not only the future nature of bureaucracy, 
which will be codified in a new Civil Service Act, whose White Paper is due 
towards the end of 2002, but also the characteristics the modern civil service 
was built upon e.g. recruitment; efficiency; hierarchy; and, permanency. The 
disenchantment of Andrew Turnbull (HoC, 2002f:365) is highlighted when he 
mentions that civil servants no longer have a permanent job for life and have to 
quite literally ‘fight for their jobs’ against external rather than internal candi-
dates. The contemporary relationship between civil servants and politicians in 
the central state has more political input, a change has occurred using Weberian 
terminology from formal to substantive authority. There has also been a revolu-
tionary change in the nature of policy-making within the state with the use of 
media techniques as well as the increase of political advisers. Parliamentary 
Committees remain both ‘peripheral irritants’ and an important future check, 
not only to balance bureaucratic functions, but what seems increasingly likely, 
increased substantive political inputs into policy-making and implementation 
processes. 
Conclusions 
Max Weber’s thoughts on bureaucracy and his writings on rationality are use-
ful analytical tools because they were based on beliefs, namely, as Bendix, 
(1965:19) mentions, ‘... the belief in rational regulations, the sanctity of tradi-
tion, of the gift of grace possessed by a person.’ Each system remains valid 
only within limits and when these limits are ignored or exceeded, the type of 
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authority changes its form. Weber (1968:262) himself acknowledges, ‘... that 
“ruling organizations” which belong only to one or another of these pure types 
are very exceptional.’ There can be a combination of authority types for Weber. 
Rational legal authority can very easily have traditional and charismatic ele-
ments within the construction. For Weber, the most important consideration, 
especially with regard to the central state, was that substantive rationality chal-
lenged formal rationality in relation to policy-making.  
Weber himself feared the influence, authority and advance of a modern ra-
tional bureaucracy. Weber (1968) was aware that bureaucrats were capable of 
‘institutional’ charisma and he sought ways in which to counter this problem. 
He particularly believed that formal bureaucratic rationality should, at the very 
least, be challenged by more economic and politically biased substantive ra-
tionality. While acknowledging the importance of bureaucratic functions within 
the state, Weber’s writings offer us potential solutions to the problem of exces-
sive civil servant authority and influence in the policy-making process. The 
parliamentary committee, with political representation, is suggested by Weber 
as a means for politicians to exert more authority with regard to policy-making. 
Indeed, Weber uses the British Parliamentary system as an example of state 
machinery that uses the select committee within the policy-making process, 
thus guaranteeing substantive, political inputs. 
By using Weber’s bureaucratic theories within an educational context, I 
would suggest the following assumptions: firstly, civil servants within educa-
tion policy-making are influenced by formal bureaucratic rationality which 
means they can have more say on policy-making processes than their adminis-
trative position within the state would suggest. This consists of educational 
civil servants technical and specialised knowledge which would give bureau-
crats a varying degree of input into the education policy-making process; sec-
ondly, a more forceful, coherent political agenda based on substantive rational-
ity concerning policy formation and development could theoretically witness a 
decline in the ‘rational’ role of the civil servant within the education policy-
making process. Thus, by examining Weber’s ideas and using the substantive 
and formal type constructs, politicians would have to assert their substantive 
ideas within the central state and use the Parliamentary Select Committee as a 
state mechanism and means to control formal rational bureaucratic inputs into 
the policy-making process. 
Political initiative stems from the top and therefore the character of the po-
litical leader, the leading group, or the politicians that shape policy in depart-
ments of state, or political interest groups was/is essential. The focus in this 
article has been on Weber’s theories, which I believe, have more applicability 
and resonance to the context of the relationship under examination. Marxist 
theories can be critiqued as Offe (1996) in particular believed bureaucracy 
could not escape from its formal, functional rationality within the state and 
could not respond to substantive, political policy objectives. Offe (1996) argues 
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that political power is determined by formal rules, which protects bourgeois 
interests. I tend to agree with Held and Krieger (1994) when they argue that 
bureaucracy can be an effective agent of political policy concerning the central 
state. Weber (1968, 1992) demands that politicians reassert their role as policy-
makers within the central state. The political function within the state, as 
Beetham (1985, 1996) argues, should be slightly more than the broadest forma-
tion of policy and rules. For the central state relationship under examination to 
change, educational politicians are required, through substantive rationality, to 
influence policy-making within education. Weber argued that formal, rational 
legal authority was too strong within the state, meaning bureaucratic authority 
had too great an influence on policy-making. He believed it was up to politi-
cians to change the nature of the central state relationship through substantive 
rationality and at the very least challenge the formal, technical knowledge that 
had accumulated in departments caused by modern, permanent bureaucratic 
functions. Weber's theories of bureaucracy is the most convincing way of in-
creasing understanding of the conditions needed for the beginnings of a theo-
retical movement of role and influence within the state relationship between 
education civil servants toward education politicians. The evidence presented 
suggests contemporary parliamentary democracy can see a visible reversal in 
this movement with substantive, political influence superseding bureaucratic 
inputs into the policy-process. A clear example of this concerns the resignation 
of Estelle Morris in October 2002, who herself suggested she was not good 
enough at strategic management within the DfES, nor was she capable of deal-
ing with the modern media.14 
                                                          
14  For early media analysis of Estelle Morris’s resignation from the DfES see: Wintour, P. 
Watt, N. (2002) ‘Morris Quits: I’ve not done as well as I should have’ The Guardian, Octo-
ber 24, 1; Macintyre, D. (2002) ‘Devoted to education but not at ease in the limelight’ The 
Independent, October 24, 5; Ahmed, K., Hinsliff, G., Bright, M. (2002) ‘How Estelle leant 
the toughest lesson of all’ The Observer, October 27, 18-19. 
